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Inequitable Valuation in Regulatory
Takings Cases: Compensation That
"Goes Too Far"
The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977
(SMCRA)' was enacted by Congress on August 3, 1977 primarily
to provide a way to protect the environment from the harmful
effects of surface coal mining while still allowing for the pro-
duction of coal as a national energy source. On October 13,
1989 the United States Claims Court, in Whitney Benefits, Inc.
v. United States,2 held that the enactment of SMCRA totally
eliminated the economic value of the plaintiffs' fee coal interest
and constituted a taking under the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. This note will trace the development
of takings law cases in light of Whitney Benefits, concentrating
on the current test for establishing a regulatory taking and the
appropriate remedy if such a taking is found.
I. THE CLAUSE AND EMINENT DoMAIN
The Just Compensation Clause in the Fifth Amendment
prohibits the government from taking private property for public
use without just compensation. The requirement of just com-
pensation applies directly to the federal government and is ap-
plied to the states through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
4
Traditionally, the government takes private property by the
process of eminent domain.5 Under the power of eminent domain
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 [hereinafter cited as
SMCRA], Pub. L. No. 95-87, § 522, § I Stat. 445 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328
(Supp. I1 1979)).
18 Cl. Ct. 394 (1989).
"[Nior shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion." U. S. CoNsT. amend. V.
I See Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 160 (1980);
Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235-41 (1897). In addition, many state
constitutions require compensation where property is taken. See, e.g. L. TREBE, AMxm-
cAN CoNsrrmoNAL LAW § 9-2, at 458 n.6 (1978).
1 See, e.g., Housing Authority of Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma v. Langley,
OK., 555 P.2d 1025, 1028 (1976); see also, EATON, REAL ESTATE VALUATiON n LMA-
noN 404 (1982) ("eminent domain" is government's right "to take private property for
public use").
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the government acquires the affirmative right to physically oc-
cupy private property or obtain possession of the property from
a private person through condemnation proceedings. The Just
Compensation Clause requires that the government pay for prop-
erty rights it acquires through eminent domain. The Supreme
Court interpreted this constitutional guarantee of just compen-
sation not as a limitation on the power of eminent domain, but
as a condition of its exercise.
6
One limitation upon the definition of a governmental taking
is the requirement that the property be taken for a public use.
Once this limitation is met, the government has unrestricted
ability to obtain any private property.7 This requirement is not
a difficult hurdle for the government to pass, because "public
use" has been liberally interpreted by the courts. However, the
government is clearly prohibited from granting its taking au-
thority to a private company simply to improve its own economic
position." In addition the government is prohibited from using
the power itself to make money in strictly entrepreneurial activ-
ities.9
II. EMERGENCE OF REGULATORY TAKWGS
Prior to the landmark decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon'O, physical invasion was necessary for a taking to occur."
In cases where the property owner was restricted in his or her
ownership rights by legislative statutes or administrative regula-
tions, the owner was not permitted to assert a governmental
taking. Even if the owner was actually harmed more by these
regulations than a property owner whose rights had been usurped
by eminent domain, the owner was prohibited from asserting a
taking. The government was protected in its actions by the
"police power." Government police power is not specialized,
rather it encompasses the right of federal, state and local gov-
6 Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U.S. 685, 689 (1897); see E.
FRauND, THE POuCE POWER 541 (1904) where the author concludes that the compen-
sation requirement has always been an element of the exercise of eminent domain in
civilized societies.
I Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). Also, the "public use" requirement of
the Taking Clause is "coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's police power."
* See, e.g., NL Industries v. Eisenman Chemical Co., 642 P.2d 976 (Nev. 1982).
See Webbs Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 163-64 (1980).
260 U.S. 393 (1922).
Id.
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ernments to enact legislation protecting the health, safety, morals
or general welfare of the people within their jurisdiction.
12
Although the government's police power is still recognized
as a viable defense, Pennsylvania Coal put an end to the notion
that the taking of property could never occur through mere
legislation." Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes acknowledged that,
as members of a civilized and complex society we must all accept
regulation and control by the governing body. However, he
tempered that general rule by stating, "if regulation goes too
far it will be recognized as a taking.'
' 4
Since Pennsylvania Coal, the Court has had difficulty artic-
ulating the point at which regulations "go too far." The Court
has yet to articulate a clear standard for determining when such
governmental activity should be considered a taking of property.
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City," the
Court stressed that, in fact, it could not devise a set formula
for determining when a regulatory taking has occurred. However
the Court did suggest a set of factors that should be considered.
These factors include the extent of the adverse economic impact
to the property owner and the extent to which the government
activity interferes "with distinct investment-backed expecta-
tions."' 6 The more extensive the economic impact and govern-
mental interference, the more likely it is that a taking will be
found. Additionally, a taking will more likely be found if the
"interference with property can be characterized as a physical
invasion by government."' 7
No one factor determines the existence of a taking in a
regulation case.' 8 A court must look at the facts of each case to
see how the property owner was impacted by the rule or regu-
lation; thus each situation is evaluated on an ad hoc basis.
Significant factors include the amount of capital the owner
invested in the property, the reasonable expectation of property
use that existed, whether the regulation was foreseeable, and
what uses of the property and rights of the owner were left
intact after the regulation. 9
12 See generally E. CoRwiN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT 88 (1948).
Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 393.
' Id. at 415.
" 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
,6 Id. at 124.
I d.
" Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
Id.
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This approach was utilized by the court in Whitney Bene-
fits.2 The following is a summary of the Whitney Benefits facts
that led the Claims Court to find a regulatory taking which
warranted just compensation by the United States.
III. FACTUAL SUMMARY OF WHITNEY BENEFITS
Whitney Benefits, Inc. is a non-profit charitable company
that owns coal in fee under 1,327 surface acres in Sheridan
County, Wyoming. Most of the land is irrigated or subirrigated
Tongue River alluvial valley floor [hereinafter AVF] making it
valuable for farming.
2'
In 1974, Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. [hereinafter PKS], a mining
corporation, leased the rights to mine coal in exchange for
advance and operating royalties. By 1977 PKS had also pur-
chased approximately 600 surface acres located above the coal
it was leasing from Whitney Benefits.2
In 1976, PKS spent one million dollars for preliminary tests
of its leased property and filed a permit application to begin
coal production with the Wyoming Department of Environmen-
tal Quality [hereinafter DEQ]. The application was withdrawn
in August of that year for procedural reasons, but PKS expressed
an intent to refile. 23
The enactment of SMCRA on August 3, 1977 effectively
prohibited surface mining in the absence of a state-issued permit.
The Act also explicitly provided that no permit or revision
application should be approved by the state unless it could be
shown that the proposed surface coal mining operation would
"not interrupt, discontinue, or preclude farming on alluvial val-
ley floors that are irrigated or naturally subirrigated . "..."24
The coal in this case was physically located under an AVF
which was significant to farming. Any attempt to mine the coal
would preclude farming activity on or near the AVF. In com-
pliance with SMCRA, Wyoming's DEQ would therefore be re-
quired to reject any application by Whitney Benefits or PKS to
mine the coal. 235
Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 18 CI. Ct. 394 (1989).
1, Id. at 396.
2 Id. at 397.
n Id.
Id. (quoting SMCRA § , 30 U.S.C. § 1260 (1982)].
z Whitney Benefits, 18 CI. Ct. at 397.
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In recognition of the inequity to coal producers, like Whitney
Benefits or PKS, who had made substantial financial commit-
ments before the Act's passage, SMCRA provided for an ex-
change of the affected property for federal coal. The plaintiffs
took advantage of this exchange provision and reapplied to the
DEQ in October of 1978. Whitney Benefits interpreted the Act
to require obtaining a rejection by the DEQ in order to qualify
for the exchange program.2
In January of 1979, Whitney Benefits' application was re-
jected by the DEQ for procedural reasons. Since 1982 the plain-
tiffs have been negotiating with the defendant concerning which
property is to be exchanged.27
In 1983-84, the plaintiffs expended $130,000 to perform test
drilling on a parcel of federal land considered for a possible
exchange. The federal government proposed a different piece of
land, called Hidden Water Tract, for an exchange. PKS rejected
that offer as they had previously mined the area and were not
interested in the coal that remained.2s
On August 3, 1983, exactly six years after SMCRA's enact-
ment, the plaintiffs filed a complaint under the Tucker Act and
the Fifth Amendment, contending that SMCRA had stripped
their property of all its economic use." The U.S. Claims Court
dismissed their action explaining that the exchange mechanism
precluded plaintiffs from asserting a Tucker Act claim. Because
SMCRA provided for just compensation on its face, the court
reasoned that there was no unconstitutional taking of the prop-
erty."
The plaintiffs then filed a "citizen suit" in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Wyoming seeking to compel an ex-
change.' The district court agreed that the government had
unreasonably delayed compensation and directed the Secretary






" Id. (the complaint was filed in the U.S. Claims Court).
- Whitney Benefits, 18 Cl. Ct. at 398.
" Id. (the suit was filed pursuait to 30 U.S.C. § 1270 (1982) in the United States
District Court for the District of Wyoming).
12 Whitney Benefits, 18 CI. Ct. at 398.
199o)-91]
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In response, the Secretary filed a notice of compliance with
the court arguing that because it would originally have been
uneconomical to surface mine the plaintiffs' property, the prop-
erty was valueless and therefore no exchange was warranted.
The Secretary stated that he offered an exchange of Hidden
Water Tract in 1986, but the plaintiffs refused to accept it."
In the meantime, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit reversed and remanded the Claims Court's earlier
dismissal, stating that the exchange provision was not determi-
native of whether SMCRA effected a taking of plaintiffs' prop-
erty. Further proceedings were ordered and extensions were
allowed to consider recent cases in takings law jurisprudence.3
On remand, the Claims Court held that enactment of SMCRA
had totally eliminated the economic value of the plaintiffs' coal
and constituted a taking under the Fifth Amendment.3 The time
of the taking was held to be August 3, 1977, the date SMCRA
became effective, and the amount of the just compensation due
the plaintiffs began accruing as of that date. 36 The court used
the valuation method which incorporated a discounted cash flow
approach to determine the fair market value of the coal on the
date of the taking. 37 It further held that the plaintiffs were
entitled to prejudgment interest.
38
IV. AD Hoc DETERMINATION
A. Property Interests
In determining whether a taking has occurred, a plaintiff
must first demonstrate that he or she has a protected interest
under the Constitution. Property interests themselves are not
created by the Constitution but must arise from an independent
source, such as state law.39 It is settled. law in Wyoming that an
' Id. at 399.
I /d. The cases to be considered were: Nollan v. California Coastal Comm., 483
U.S. 825 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. .470 (1987);
and MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, reh'g denied, 478
U.S. 1035 (1986).
1, Whitney Benefits, 18 Cl. Ct. at 406.
6 Id. at 407.
Id. at 416.
"Id.
See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
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interest in minerals constitutes a property interest. 4° One's min-
eral interest is distinct from any interest in the surface land.
41
Thus Whitney Benefits' fee ownership in the coal under the AVF
is a constitutionally protected property interest. Further, the U.S.
Supreme Court has held that a lease interest is also property,
and that an injured lessee has a property right requiring com-
pensation. 42 Therefore, if PKS could demonstrate that it was
harmed by SMCRA's implementation, it, like Whitney Benefits,
could also recover for a taking in violation of the Constitution.
B. Character of the Government Action
The second consideration in a takings analysis is the char-
acter of the government's action that allegedly led to the clai-
mant's injury.43 If the government regulates to such an extent
that the property interference approaches an actual physical
invasion by the public, it is more likely that a taking will be
found.4 However, if the government action is justified as
"aris[ing] from some public program adjusting the benefits and
burdens of economic life to promote the common good," 45 it
will less likely be seen as a taking.46
In Whitney Benefits7 the governmental action is Congress'
enactment of SMCRA, a piece of social and economic legisla-
tion, the clear purpose of which was to protect the environment
from the harmful effects of strip mining. 4 The Act is facially
constitutional because it does not bar all beneficial use of coal-
bearing land. 49 It only regulates the conditions under which coal
,0 Whitney Benefits, 18 Cl. Ct. at 405 [citing Williams v. Watt, 668 P.2d 620, 624-
25 (Vyo. 1983) and Skaw v. United States, 740 F.2d 932, 935-36 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(mineral rights are property subject to the Fifth Amendment's Taking Clause)).
-1 Id.
41 A. W. Duckett & Co. v. United States, 266 U.S. 149 (1924).
41 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
" See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982)
(Distinguishing the case from Penn Central, the court said a permanent physical invasion
"does not simply take a single 'strand' from the 'bundle' of property rights: it chops
through the bundle, taking a slice of every strand." Id. at 435).
41 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
4Id.
41 18 CI.Ct. 394.
- SMCRA § 102, 30 U.S.C. § 1202 (1982).
19 Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n., Inc., 452 U.S. 264,
268 (1981).
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production may be conducted and does not attempt to regulate
any alternative uses for the property affected." Furthermore,
while strip mining has not been classified as a noxious use of
property," it is within Congress' power to reduce and limit its
harmful effects whenever possible.
Conversely, "[t]o make it commercially impracticable to mine
certain coal has very nearly the same effect for constitutional
purposes as appropriating or destroying it.' '12 It is clear that the
state has the power to regulate property without payment of
compensation, yet if the regulation goes too far a taking may
be found. 53 In performing the balancing test to resolve the char-
acter of the governmental action in Whitney Benefits" the court
held that the restrictions put on the plaintiffs' coal went "too
far."" Although this result is certainly within the court's discre-
tion, it conflicts with the recent trend 6 to refuse compensation
for similar types of regulation.
In regulatory takings cases, courts are much more likely to
find a taking from a state-imposed restriction depriving a prop-
erty owner of "all beneficial use" of his property. 7 The defen-
dant in Whitney Benefits attempted to suggest that because the
plaintiffs could perform underground mining to extract their
coal, mine other minerals instead of the coal, or farm and ranch
the surface property, there were important alternative uses for
the property. 5" However the court held that underground mining
was not feasible as an alternative use for the property.59 The
50Id.
31 See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668 (1887) ("A prohibition simply
upon the use of property for purposes that are declared ... to be injurious to the
health, morals, or safety of the community, cannot... be deemed a taking ... ). It
is well'recognized that one cannot be viewed to have a property right to engage in
"noxious conduct". The illegalization of the manufacture and sale of dangerous drugs
or of a polluting activity are therefore never considered to be infringements of property
rights. I personally question if strip-mining should not be included as a "polluting
activity", but thus far the courts have not categorized it as such.
32 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon; 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922).
1 Id. at 415.
14 18 Cl. Ct. 394.
" See supra text accompanying notes 13-14.
"6 See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987)
(where the court refused to compensate when the landowner could utilize other aspects
of his property).
" First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S.
304, 311 (1987).
Whitney Benefits, 18 Cl. Ct. at 405.
" Id.
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court also correctly pointed out that the other alternative uses
are not related to coal rights and that it was the loss of coal
rights that was affected by the Act.6 The fact that the plaintiffs
could use other property they own to gain a profit did not
excuse the government for rendering the coal property useless.
6
1
C. Economic Impact and Investment Backed Expectations
The third consideration in the takings analysis consists of
examining the situation from an economic perspective, both
before and after the impact of the regulation. A court must note
any adverse economic impact6 2 suffered by the plaintiff, espe-
cially if such adverse impact is caused in part by investment-
backed expectations. 63 If some negative impact is shown, the
government is required to compensate the claimant, even if the
regulation only temporarily deprives an individual of his or her
property rights." However, the property owner still bears the
burden of showing a substantial deprivation 65 not within the
protection of the state's "police power" to regulate.6 Addition-
ally, it may be a requirement that the regulation was reasonably
unexpected by the property owner. The remedy for the actual
negative economic impact will be more fully explored in the next
section.
D. Just Compensation
1. The Tail Wagging the Dog
Once a court has established that there was a regulatory
taking, the Constitution demands that the government entity pay
60 Id.
6 Id.; but see First English Evangelical, 482 U.S. at 304.
62 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
0 Id.
6" First English Evangelical, 482 U.S. at 318.
' Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 415. See also Kirby Forest Industries, Inc.
v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 14 (1984):
... while most burdens consequent upon government action under-
taken in the public interest must be borne by individual landowners as
concomitants of 'the advantage of living and doing business in a civilized
community", some are so substantial and unforeseeable, and can so easily
be indentified and redistributed, that "justice and fairness require that they
be borne by the public as a whole".
66 Id.
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just compensation for the period beginning on the date the
regulation first effected the taking and ending on the date the
government entity chooses to end the regulation. 6 It has been
suggested that the same principles for determining the proper
measure of just compensation ordinarily applied in formal con-
demnation proceedings and physical invasion cases should be
applied in cases of permanent or temporary takings. 6s However,
there have been problems in determining the proper amount of
compensation due an owner in a regulatory taking.
The same theory of compensation that exists for eminent
domain cases exists for regulatory takings: when the public,
through governmental action, substantially infringes on private
property rights, it should take the burden of paying for the
public benefit from that private individual and spread these costs
among the whole of society. This theory is premised on the
recognition that it is patently unfair to force an individual to
suffer alone for the benefit of everyone else.69
Unlike an eminent domain situation,70 regulators face uncer-
tainty whenever they propose to implement any new restriction
on land use such as zoning ordinances, 7' land-development
prohibitions72 or environmental legislation such as SMCRA.73 It
is certainly more difficult for a complainant to prevail in an
inverse condemnation proceeding74 and recover damages to the
67 San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 653 (1981)
(Brennan, J. dissenting).
- Id. at 653, 657, 658-9 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
- Frst English Evangelical, 482 U.S. at 318 ("It is axiomatic that the Fifth
Amendment's just compensation provision is designed to bar Government from forcing
some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be
borne by the public as a whole.") (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,
49 (1960).
- This is the most often cited reason to avoid holding a taking has occurred in
regulatory cases.
Agins v. City of Tiburn, 447 U.S. 255, 257 (1980).
MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 447 U.S. 340 (1986).
" Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n., Inc., 452 U.S. 264
(1981).
" San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 638 n.2 (1981)
(Brennan, J. dissenting) (citations omitted) According to Justice Brennan:
The phrase 'inverse condemnation' generally describes a cause of
action against a government defendant in which a landowner may recover
just compensation for a "taking" of his property under the Fifth Amend-
ment, even though formal condemnation proceedings in exercise of the
sovereign's power of eminent domain have not been instituted by the
government entity... (Ilt is the landowner, not the government entity,
who institutes the proceeding.
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same extent he would be entitled to under other types of takings.
For example, in Agins v. Tiburon 7 the court held that a property
owner, suing for money damages on the theory of inverse con-
demnation because his land had been allegedly taken by a zoning
ordinance substantially limiting the use of his property, could
challenge the constitutionality of the ordinance and its applica-
tion to his property through the procedure of mandamus or
declaratory relief. However, the court declared that "the use of
inverse condemnation with its imposition of money damages
upon the public entity would, in our view, unwisely inhibit the
proper and necessary exercise of a valid police power.
7 6
Agins limited the practical victory for a prevailing plaintiff
since monetary damages were not thought to be an appropriate
remedy for regulatory takings. However, the Supreme Court
broadened the possibility for a plaintiff's success by clarifying
the test for determining when such a taking had occurred. It
stated "[t]he application of a general zoning law to particular
property effects a taking if (1) the ordinance does not substan-
tially advance legitimate state interests, or (2) denies an owner
economically viable use of his land."" Instead of requiring both
factors to establish a taking, Agins allowed for recovery when
only one prong was satisfied.
It seems that Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v.
DeBenedictis78 and Whitney Benefits79 both followed the Agins
rationale. In Keystone, the Court held that neither prong was
satisfied and thus there was no taking.80 The court in Whitney
Benefits held that both prongs were satisfied, and thus a taking
was found. Interestingly, in both cases the regulation in question
affected rights associated with coal mining, but the conclusions
of the respective courts are contradictory.
The result in Keystone is probably the most practical, al-
though the test used was the broadened one put forth by Agins.
I 24 Cal.3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal Rptr. 372 (1979), aff'd 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
" Agins, 24 Cal. 3d at 278 (On appeal the United States Supreme Court affirmed
the state court's decision that no taking had occurred. Agins v. Tiburn, 447 U.S. 255
(1980)). The Supreme Court expressly refused to consider whether "a state may limit
the remedies available to a person whose land has been taken without just compensa.
tion." Agins, 447 U.S. at 263.
" Agins, 447 U.S. at 260 (citations omitted).
79 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (considering the constitutionality of a state act similar to
the statute struck down in Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)).
" 18 Cl. Ct. 394 (1989).
" Keystone, 480 U.S. at 501.
1990-91]
JouRNAL OF MINERAL LAW & POLICY
Perhaps a better approach would be to balance both prongs of
the Agins test. In a situation where a property owner is denied
the economic use of his land, but the regulation substantially
advances legitimate state interests, the government will have to
come forward with full compensatory relief.
Theoretically, this is what the Constitution demands for a
fair and just result. Practically, however, such a result could
create substantial financial burdens on government, particularly
at the state and local levels. Furthermore, the government might
be reticent to enact proper, helpful legislation for fear of opening
itself up to huge5 ' claims for compensation from allegedly af-
fected individuals. Understanding the potentially destructive out-
come of such a situation, state and local courts will tend to find
no abrogation of the claimant's economic interest in his prop-
erty. Perhaps they will hold that no taking has occurred in order
to eliminate the need to pay just compensation, when the issue
of just compensation should only be considered after it is decided
a taking has occurred.
2. Fair Market Value
The basic principle for determining the amount due an in-
dividual whose property has been taken is contained in the
statement by Justice Holmes that the test is "what has the owner
lost, not what has the taker gained. ' ' 82 The courts look to the
market value of the property taken to affix a value on what the
owner has lost.83 Additionally, a court will look to the value of
the property at its "highest and best use.'' 84 In most cases, this
value is determined by the "fair market value on the date it is
appropriated. " 81
The fair market value is "what a willing buyer would pay
in cash to a willing seller." 86 Traditionally, courts have looked
For example, in Whitney Benefits the court held the claimants were entitled to
$60,296,000.00 plus pre-judgement interest on that amount. Whitney Benefits, 18 Cl.
Ct. at 416. See Agins, 447 U.S. at 260 (threat of monetary damages has "chilling"
effect on adoption of innovative zoning).
Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910).
'3 Note, Valuation of Conrail Under the Fifth Amendment, 90 HAxv. L. REv.
596, 598 (1977).
- Id. at 599.
8, Kirby, 467 U.S. at 10 [citing United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S.
506, 511-513 (1979)].
- United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943).
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at the basis of a fair rental value for the property,8 7 interest on
the property's market value, or actual .damages incurred be-
cause of the deprivation of use89 in situations where it is difficult
to determine a fair market price at the time of the takings or
"would result in manifest injustice to owner or public . . . . ' 90
The Supreme Court has stated that the market test is not
definitive, but rather the overall standard is to be governed by
equitable principles of fairness. 91 However, it is not proper to
compensate any expenditures for appraisal fees92 nor is it proper
to obtain a remedy based on replacement cost of the property. 93
The value is to be determined at the time of the taking,
94
and if there is a delay between the time of taking and the time
of payment, the owner is also entitled to interest on the value
of the property from the date of the taking." The compensation
may also be adjusted if the value of the property changed
materially during any delay."
Generally, the court will rely on an appraiser's estimation of
the fair market value that he or she obtains by the market,
reproduction cost, or income capitalization method of ap-
praisal. 97 The market method is the most common way to ap-
praise property affected by eminent domain. However, this may
not be the most appropriate method of evaluation for land use
regulatory cases because the size and quality of the lands are
typically different." One commentator points out that in using
the income capitalization approach, the courts determine a value
of projected net earnings attributable to income-producing prop-
erty to calculate present value. 99
" This is a good measure to use in temporary takings cases. Kimball Laundry Co.
v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1948).
See Nemmers v. City of Dubuque, 764 F.2d 502 (8th Cir. 1985).
,This compensates for lost profits.
90 Kirby, 467 U.S. at 10, n.14 [quoting United States v. Commodities Trading
Corp. 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950)].
" United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488 (1973).
92 United States v. Bodcaw Co., 440 U.S. 202 (1979) (per curiam).
9 United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506 (1979).
- Kirby, 467 U.S. at 10.
" Id.
' Id.
17 See United States v. 100 Acres of Land, 468 F.2d 1261, 1267-68 (9th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 822 (1973); In re James Madison Houses, 17 A.D.2d 317, 323-
24, 234 N.Y.S.2d 799, 806 (1962).
" Note, Inverse Condemnation: Valuation of Compensation in Land Use Regu-
latory Cases, 17 Sui'FoLK U.L. REv. 621, 642-43 (1983).
" Id. at 643. See generally UNrI. Emmrr DommN CODE § 1110 (1974) (explaining
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a. Fair Market Value as Determined in Whitney Benefits
In Whitney Benefits, the court rejected the defendant's con-
tention that the proper method for determining the fair market
value of the coal is the comparable sales approach.10° In this
method, the appraiser "uses sales and purchases of properties
that reasonably resemble the subject property with respect to
time, place, and circumstances.''0 In order for this method to
work, there must be comparable property that was bought by a
willing buyer and sold by a willing seller.1l 2 The court found
that there was no such property available for comparison. 03
Instead, the court decided to use a discounted cash flow
(DCF) approach by "valuing the property based on the dis-
counted stream of income the property is capable of producing
over its useful economic life."' ° This method (called the "Boyd
Plan" because it represented the name of the plaintiffs' appraiser
who submitted the plan) uses the DCF analysis based on the
capitalization of the projected income stream to value the coal.' °5
The Court described in detail the factors considered in its adop-
tion of the Boyd Plan for valuation in the instant case.
The method used by the court in Whitney Benefits evaluated
the amount that a willing buyer would have paid for the property
interest at the time of SMCRA's enactment.1°6 In determining
capitalization of income).
Courts and commentators, for a variety of reasons, are not supportive of
income capitalization as a measure of value. See A.G. Davis Ice Co. v.
United States, 362 F.2d 934, 936-37 (1st Cir. 1966) (projected net earnings
or lost profits too speculative because depend on variable factors such as
taxes, economic conditions, competition, labor, or knowledge of owner);
4 SAcKA N, (citation omitted) (reasons for rejecting income capitalization
appraisal in eminent domain cases include conjecture concerning value of
human efforts). But see City of Revere v. Revere Constr. Co., 285 Mass.
243, 249, 189 N.E. 73, 75 (1934) (holding when net income related to
location, rather than skill, can be considered); ....
Id. at 643, n. 106.
10 Whitney Benefits, 18 Cl. Ct. at 408.
10, Id.




I- Whitney Benefits, 18 Cl. Ct. at 408.
'01 Id. at 410 ("[l1n its Plan, the Boyd Company performed a full independent
analysis of the 1977 coal market and concluded that a willing buyer would have assumed
that it could sell Whitney coal for $13.13 per ton.").
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this value, the reasonable annual production rate,' 07 the price of
the coal,os and capital and operating costs' 09 were estimated,
based on both information obtained by an industry publica-
tion,11O and expert testimony about such matters for similar area
mines.II
The court discounted by eleven percent the valuation amount
obtained.12 This discount percentage was chosen because it was
found that the rate generally applied in the coal industry in 1977
fell in the range between eight and twelve percent.' 3 Addition-
ally, a ten percent discount rate was used in BLM's Guide to
Federal Coal Property Appraisal" 4 and the NRET (BLM's
Northwest Regional Evaluation Team) had previously used a ten
percent rate to value Whitney Coal for exchange purposes. 115
Apparently, the court in Whitney Benefits was also relying
on the defendant's own previous valuation assessment of the
property in issue. The court mentions several times that the
figures found at each stage are comparable or even conservative
when compared with the government's earlier documentation of
its negotiations with the plaintiffs."
6
The defendant argued that the Boyd Plan was too specula-
tive," 7 and that it compensated for lost profits."8 The defendant
further asserted that lost profits are clearly not compensable in
07 Id. ("[TIhis court finds that such [a] purchaser likely could secure utility coal
contracts for 2 million tons of coal per year and industrial coal contracts for an additional
500,000 tons.").
IN Id.
1*9 Id. at 413 (These costs would include expenditures related to labor costs at the
mine, mine development drilling, laboratory costs, legal accounting, marketing, admin-
istrative services, insurance expenses, property taxes, SMCRA's reclamation fee, unit
price costs of capital expenditures, etc., less work already done by PKS.).
Whitney Benefits, 18 Cl. Ct. at 411 n.15 (The publication is Coal Week).
Id. (i.e. Sheridan County, Wyoming).
"' Id. at 412-13 (This figure was increased one percent due to risk factors associated
with the proposed production: "Whitney was undeveloped; the proposed 4 million ton
per year production rate might take several years to reach; a buyer of Whitney might
not be able to acquire additional surface land; DEQ might not approve the Boyd Plan's
river diversions; DEQ might not approve the Boyd Plan's final impoundments; and the
price of coal might decrease over time.").
"I Id. at 412.
"4 Id. (quoting the Appraisal Guide: "In general, the use of a discount rate
adjustment to account for risk is not recommended because of overwhelming subjectivity
involved in selecting the risk premium.").
"I Whitney Benefits, 18 Cl. Ct. at 412.
116 See id. at 411-13.
11 Id. at 410.
"' Id. at 409.
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regulatory takings cases because lost profits "would be compen-
sation for value added to the property taken by the plaintiffs'
location and goodwill, their management skill, and. all the po-
tential risks and opportunities that make up the concept of
profit."" 9 They are "derived from business activities [that] de-
pend to a greater extent upon the amount of capital invested
and the good fortune, business skill and management with which
the business is conducted [rather] than . . . the land itself."'
20
The distinction between compensation based on lost profits,
and the compensation awarded the plaintiffs in Whitney Benefits
is unclear. The court stressed that because the case involved coal
reserves, the valuation could only be measured by the coal's
ability to produce income.' 2' It is true that the coal is not
valuable unless it can be extracted and utilized. 22 However, the
method used in this case seems to go beyond the mere capitai4-
zation of speculative income. The Boyd Plan looks at the market
for Whitney coal in 1977 and provides a list of buyers that
would have used the coal. This compilation is not reliable be-
cause, in addition to the quality and proximity of the coal, the
buyers would presumably buy Whitney coal based on consider-
ations such as the seller's reputation and ability to conduct the
deal properly. In fact, the managerial skill of the seller might
completely outweigh the quality of the coal as an indication of
how much, if any, coal was'sold to these buyers.
3. An Alternative Approach
123
Because of the problems encountered with a DCF approach
in Whitney Benefits, a better solution might be to require the
government to compensate PKS for its considerable financial
outlay in connection with testing its leased interest and the
proposed federal property exchange.24 This reimbursement would
Id. (distinguishing Mitchell v. United States, 267 U.S...341 (1925); Joslin Mfg.
Co. v. City of Providence, 262 U.S. 668 (1923); and United States v. General Motors
Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945)).
I Id. (quoting Cloverport Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 178, 191
(1984)).
121 Whitney Benefits, 18 Cl. Ct. at 409.
'2 See Note, supra note 83.
I' An alternative approach is warranted because courts generally do not feel com-
fortable using income capitalization. See supra note 99.
-= This would include $1 million from March 1976 and.S130,000 from 1983, with
interest paid on each amount from the date incurred.
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only be afforded if the expenditures were reasonably based on
PKS's investment-backed expectations,' 2 and could be lowered
by any amount the court found would be fair and just based on
the nature of the property involved. The goal of this approach
would be to put the lessor/owner in a position that resembles
as closely as possible the position he or she was in prior to the
attempt to realize any gains from the property.
The court should try to balance the necessity of the govern-
ment imposed regulation with the potential value of the property
without the impact of that regulation. 26 If the regulation was
found to be of a paramount interest, no further compensation
should be required. 27 If the necessity of the regulation did not
substantially outweigh the property interest, the government
should be required to compensate as if it had condemned the
property through eminent domain and in fact, would be able to
acquire title to any remaining interest after compensation was
paid.
The difficulty would arise if the necessity of the regulation
substantially outweighed the property interest, but was not one
of the paramount' 2 state interests. Perhaps in that situation a
court could require that the property owner be awarded less than
the market value' 29 of his or her interest. The amount of com-
pensation could be set by the court through its analysis of the
fairest result for both the property owner and the public. 30
Under this alternative, the lessee would probably never be
fully indemnified, and based on the purpose of the regulation
in question, the owner might or might not be fully compen-
sated. '3 However, "just compensation" requires that the com-
" A "reasonable investment-backed expectation" must be more than a "unilateral
expectation or an abstract need." See Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies Inc. v. Beckwith,
449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980).
,16 For example, the prohibition of using the property in a "noxious" manner. See
supra note 51.
"I This seems only fair. If the regulation had a valid purpose and the property
owner wished to condemn the property, he should be willing to give up all rights to it
in return for compensation based on the fair market price of the property on the date
of the taking.
' See supra text accompanying note 46.
"2 As determined by what a willing buyer would pay for the property, absent the
regulation, on the day the regulation effected a taking.
110 The Just Compensation Clause must be construed to demand fairness and
justness for both the government and private property owners.
"I This is acceptable in certain situations. See United States v. 564.54 Acres of
Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511-12 (1979).
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* pensation paid by the government for taking property must be
fair and just to both sides. In a world where governmental
entities had unlimited fiscal resources, the equitable solution
would be to compensate a particular owner or lessor for every
interest he might have in property, including substantial emo-
tional and psychological ties to a unique piece of land, or a
particular profit-making potential based on the experience of the
holder. 
3 2
However, in the real world, the government does not have
unlimited reserves and the function of providing zoning laws
and land use restrictions is a vital task our government must
perform. It may be "unfair" to require one or a few persons to
bear the burden of providing a benefit for society as a whole.
Nevertheless, to a certain extent, it is the only realistic way to
ensure that the state and local governments, in particular, do
not abandon their duty to ensure that our environment is clean
and safe, that our towns are not left to grow unchecked, and
that the private landowner does not dictate for the whole pop-
ulace what development will occur.'
CONCLUSION
The courts have recently begun to allow monetary compen-
sation for inverse condemnation proceedings based on the reg-
ulatory takings theory. While this trend has been proper, in that
some cases justify such awards, perhaps there should be a tighter
limit on the valuation method employed in determining the
amount of compensation paid. It is essential that courts continue
to decide each of thele cases on an ad hoc basis, both to establish
whether a taking has in fact occurred and the proper remedy
required of the government when its regulations cross the line
and go "too far." In Whitney Benefits, the court properly found
a taking, but chose to award compensation based on a method
which might not be fair and equitable to both sides of the case.
An alternative method was suggested, with the realization that
such method left much to the discretion of each court. The
M But see United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. at 511-12 (there is a
difficulty in assessing the value an individual places upon a particular piece of property
and because of the need for a clear, easily administrable rule governing the measure of
"just compensation," the factors probably would still not be considered in valuation).
" The author realizes that the proposed alternative approach may not address all
situations where a regulatory taking could occur.
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courts appear to have recently leapt from one side of the fence
in exclusively protecting the action of the government, to the
other side in compensating property owners for what they could
have gained from their property absent the regulation. This flip
flop in the judicial approach to takings cases has been at the
expense of the public, who must pay the compensation awarded
through their government. A more balanced perspective would
compensate the private owner on a more conservative basis while
considering the competing interests of each side.
Lori C. Hudson

